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EXECUTIVE BRANCH REGULATION OF CRIMINAL
DEFENSE COUNSEL AND THE PRIVATE CONTRACT
LIMIT ON PROSECUTOR BARGAINING
Darryl K. Brown*
INTRODUCTION
As is true of most constitutional rights, the right to counsel in crimi-
nal cases is subject to regulation by all three government branches:
judicial, legislative, and executive. Some of those regulatory actions
are well known and uncontroversial, such as appellate courts defining
the parameters of constitutional rights or trial judges setting standards
for admission to practice in local courts. Others are sometimes con-
troversial but similarly well known, such as legislatures setting funding
levels-often too low-to pay for indigent defendants' appointed
counsel. But the executive branch's capacity to affect access to, and
the effectiveness of, defense counsel is more troublesome and, as a
consequence, often discussed by scholars, practitioners, and even leg-
islators.' Nonetheless, in recent years, prosecutors have more actively
affected the power and effectiveness of defense counsel, especially
privately financed counsel in white-collar crime cases.
The U.S. Department of Justice has faced a range of objections to
its recently revised policy, 2 outlined in the so-called Thompson
* Professor of Law and David H. Ibbeken Research Professor, University of Virginia School
of Law. I am grateful to Scott Sundby, Dan Richman, Paul Butler, and participants in the
DePaul University College of Law 2007 Clifford Symposium for insightful comments on earlier
drafts. I completed much of the work on this project while on the faculty of Washington and Lee
University School of Law, and I am grateful for support from the Frances Lewis Law Center
there.
1. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007); Tamar R.
Birckhead, The Conviction of Lynne Stewart and the Uncertain Future of the Right to Defend, 43
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2006), Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal Advice, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 669
(2005); Letter from Michael S. Greco, American Bar Association (ABA) President, to Att'y
Gen. Alberto Gonzales, Proposal for Revising Department of Justice Attorney-Client Privilege
and Work Product Doctrine Waiver Policy (May 2, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/
poladv/letters/attyclient/060502letter.acprivgonz.pdf; AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL ET AL., THE DE-
CLINE OF THE ATFORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT, available at http://
www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient2.pdf.
2. See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't Compo-
nents & U.S. Att'ys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mc-
nulty-memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memo]; Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr.,
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Memo.3 That policy undercuts private counsel in white-collar crime
cases in two ways. First, prosecutors often make the severity of
charges against the firm contingent upon the firm waiving attorney-
client and work-product privileges, a practice that lowers barriers to
the government's investigation of the firm. A range of industry
groups, defense attorneys, and the American Bar Association have
objected to this policy, 4 and some in Congress have pushed to limit the
practice. 5 Last year, the U.S. Sentencing Commission abandoned a
similar two-year-old guideline that made sentence reductions contin-
gent upon privilege waivers.6
Second, federal prosecutors encourage-critics say coerce-corpo-
rate defendants to not pay the legal fees of corporate officers who face
separate indictments by making leniency for the firm contingent upon
nonpayment. Individual defendants in the KPMG tax fraud case re-
cently won a challenge to that policy. 7 There, a federal district court
held that prosecutors violated the Due Process Clause and the Sixth
Amendment Counsel Clause and dismissed thirteen individuals from
the case.8 Prosecutors have also targeted firms' payments of attor-
neys' fees to officers through forfeiture statutes, under which prosecu-
tors restrain assets that defendants need to pay defense counsel.
Acting Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Att'ys (Oct. 21, 2005) (on file
with author).
3. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't Compo-
nents & U.S. Att'ys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guide
lines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo]. The policies established by the Thompson Memo were
later reprinted in the U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, tit. 9, § 162 (2006), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/crmOO162.htm.
4. The ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution in August 2005 opposing prosecutorial
policies that seek waivers of attorney-client and work-product privileges. See http://www.abanet.
org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (describing the ABA's
involvement).
5. Senator Arlen Specter introduced a bill barring federal prosecutors from demanding waiv-
ers of attorney-client privilege. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th
Cong. (2007). The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
held hearings on the issue on March 7, 2006. See http://judiciary.house.gov/oversight.aspxID=
222 (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (providing a webcast of the hearing and written statements of
witnesses Associate Attorney General Robert D. McCallum, Jr., former Attorney General Dick
Thornburgh, U.S. Chamber of Commerce President and CEO Thomas J. Donohue, and others).
6. On April 2, 2006, the Commission removed the privilege-waiver amendment from U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines § 8C2.5: the amendment went into effect as of November 1, 2006.
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (Supp. 2006).
7. United States v. Stein (KPMG 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
8. United States v. Stein (KPMG /), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (dismissing indict-
ments for violation of substantive due process).
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Prosecutors use this strategy not only in drug and organized-crime
cases, but also in corporate and white-collar crime cases. 9
It is helpful to view these recent practices in the context of other
Justice Department strategies to monitor or limit defense representa-
tion. The Department has successfully defended its policy of breach-
ing attorney-client privilege when national security or the risk of
serious crime requires it. In these cases, government officials eaves-
dropped on private attorney-client communications.' 0 Additionally,
with the aid of trial judges, prosecutors have long had other, indirect
means to limit defendants' choice of counsel. They can urge local
courts to enforce narrow standards for pro hac vice admission of attor-
neysa" and object to defendants' willingness to waive an attorney's
conflict of interest, thereby denying a defendant the attorney she most
prefers.12
This Article has two goals. The first is to situate Justice Department
pressure on corporate and white-collar defense counsel within a larger
framework of executive regulation of defense counsel. The second is
more specific: this Article criticizes the constitutional rationale of the
KPMG court but identifies a distinct constitutional limit-more con-
sistent with the doctrines governing plea bargaining and asset forfei-
ture-on prosecutorial power to undermine privately funded defense
counsel. Like the KPMG holding, this doctrine provides a means for
defendants to resist one significant form of such Justice Department
regulation: nonpayment of corporate employees' attorneys' fees.' 3
Part II of this Article sketches the government's abilities to regulate
the various components of defense counsel practice as a basis for as-
9. In a recent corporate fraud case, prosecutors convinced the trial judge to restrain the cor-
porations from making attorneys' fee payments for two of its top officers charged with fraud
offenses on grounds that the firm's payments were traceable to the officers' fraud. United States
v. Wittig, No. 03-40142-JAR, 2004 WL 1490406 (D. Kan. June 30, 2004) (allowing a firm to give
defendant-officers funds for attorneys' fees but enjoining defendants from transferring those
funds to their attorneys), modified, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D. Kan. 2004), reinstated, 2005 WL
1227914 (D. Kan. May 23, 2005) (after mistrial and re-indictment, reinstating restraining order
on attorneys' fees payments by firm and placing funds for attorneys' fees in escrow). For an
overview of the Wittig case disputes over payments for attorneys' fees, see Robert G. Morvillo &
Robert J. Anello, Criminal-Case Compensation of Fees: Not A Defendant's Right?, 233 N.Y. L.J.
1 (June 7, 2005).
10. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2005) (describing the Bureau of Prisons's "special administrative
measures" for "prevention of acts of violence and terrorism" that allow the Bureau to monitor
attorney-client communications when it has "reasonable suspicion" that those communications
will "further or facilitate acts of terrorism").
11. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
12. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
13. See KPMG 11, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390.
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sessing executive branch policies to undermine counsel. 14 It suggests
that the organizing concern for regulation of counsel is not simply fair-
ness or defendants' self-interest, 15 but also accuracy and a less-noted
goal, effectiveness of criminal law enforcement. As the Supreme
Court noted, the parameters of defendants' constitutional rights are
crafted in light of "the adverse impact ...upon the Government's
interests," including "the Government's interest in securing those
guilty pleas that are factually justified ... [and] the efficient adminis-
tration of justice. '1 6
Part III analyzes the government's regulation of privately funded
defense counsel in relation to accuracy and enforcement objectives.' 7
The Court has recognized and deferred to prosecutors' unique abili-
ties, especially knowledge of law enforcement needs and management
of litigation burdens. 8 When prosecutors block defendants' choice of
counsel by pushing for defense counsel's disqualification or seeking
forfeiture of defendants' funds to pay counsel, courts have been sup-
portive, in substantial part because courts must approve those tactics
as well. 19 But Part III argues that demands for privilege waivers and
firms' nonpayment of employees' attorneys' fees fit a different model,
in which prosecutors are much less restrained or regulated by courts.
Despite the recent district court decision in the KPMG case finding
such prosecutorial tactics unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has left
little doctrinal basis for restricting prosecutors' incentives to bargain
for defendant cooperation.20
Part IV suggests how firms, through private contract, can take much
of the sting out of prosecutors' abilities to demand nonpayment of
attorneys' fees. 21 Further, courts are likely to be receptive to a narrow
constitutional doctrine that bars prosecutorial incentives for firms to
breach duties to pay fees, because that doctrine would be grounded in
protecting contract obligations as much as the right to counsel. Part V
concludes that, because the policies underlying the Thompson Memo
14. See infra notes 23-50 and accompanying text.
15. Nor is a primary concern of this set of doctrines the lawyer's discretion and the tension
between clients' interests and public interests, which are prominent themes in professional re-
sponsibility literature. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF
LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998).
16. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002) (noting that "due process considerations"
require balancing defendants' interests against the "adverse impact ... [o]n the Government's
interests").
17. See infra notes 51-89 and accompanying text.
18. See id.
19. In the case of forfeiture, legislatures must first authorize such tactics.
20. United States v. Stein (KPMG I1), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
21. See infra notes 90-122 and accompanying text.
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are unlikely to be revised any time soon, the contract approach pro-
posed in this Article may provide a feasible method of limiting prose-
cutors' ability to bargain for nonpayment of attorneys' fees. 22
II. METHODS AND GOALS OF REGULATING DEFENSE COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment's Counsel Clause grants two legal entitle-
ments.2 3 The first, which tracks the Counsel Clause's original intent,
allows defendants to hire counsel.2 4 The second grants indigent de-
fendants publicly financed counsel. 25 Both versions of counsel entitle-
ment leave questions about government power to limit counsel
unanswered, because, like other entitlements, this one is comprised of
several components, each of which can be regulated differently. The
counsel entitlement-again, like others-can be defined by two differ-
ent variables: eligibility criteria and benefit levels.26 The Supreme
Court has clearly defined the former in constitutional law. Anyone
charged with a crime may hire private counsel.27 Those who are at
risk of incarceration and are unable to hire counsel are eligible for
publicly financed lawyers,28 and those accused of felonies are eligible
regardless of the prospect of incarceration. 9
The benefit levels of this right, however, are not well defined by
constitutional doctrine, so its real content is mostly defined by other
players. This Part describes how benefit levels are determined not
only in light of defendants' interests, but also in light of competing,
systemic goals of adjudication accuracy and law enforcement effec-
tiveness. With those interests at stake, in addition to defendant-ori-
ented fairness, the executive branch has a stronger role, and claim to
competence, in regulating counsel. In this view, contrary to much
boilerplate language in the case law and scholarly literature, debates
regarding defense counsel are not solely about the resources necessary
22. See infra notes 123-130 and accompanying text.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. See David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 633
(2004).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28. This is true even in the case of a suspended sentence. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S.
654 (2002).
29. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that there is no right to counsel in misde-
meanor cases if the defendant faces no term of imprisonment); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972) (establishing the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing the right to appointed counsel in felony cases).
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for attorneys to serve clients' interests and achieve a fair process-the
framework for much right-to-counsel litigation.30
Recall that the Justice Department eavesdrops on communications
between lawyers and their federally detained clients, effectively deny-
ing some defendants attorney-client privilege. 31 Lower courts have
approved this practice when the Department asserts that the defen-
dant is particularly dangerous-especially if she has suspected ties to
terrorism-and the attorney might be a conduit for communication
with collaborators. 32 Prosecutors bargain case-by-case for broader
privilege waivers. That weakens defense counsel by removing a signif-
icant information control tool. Under the Thompson Memo, such
waivers by corporate defendants are commonly a condition for civil
settlement of potentially criminal charges, deferred prosecution agree-
ments, or plea bargain discounts. 33
Legislatures define other components of the entitlement with input
from local trial courts and prosecutors. On the indigent side, legisla-
tures set funding levels to define the content of the counsel benefit.
Those funding levels are routinely capped, often at inadequate
levels. 34 Minimal funding for attorneys' fees gives lawyers incentives
to invest less effort in cases. Legislatures, together with trial courts,
further control appointed lawyers' investigative capacity by limiting
funds for expert and investigator assistance and evidence analysis.
Under Ake v. Oklahoma, defendants who are entitled to appointed
counsel are entitled to expert assistance only for "significant factor[s]"
in the trial. 35 Trial judges make that judgment-though legislatures
may provide statutory guidance-and legislatures or local govern-
ments allocate funds, but typically leave the distribution of those
funds to trial judges.36 Tight budgets force trial judges, whose budget
30. See, e.g.. Gideon. 372 U.S. 335; State v. Citizen. 898 So. 2d 325 (La. 2005): State v. Peart,
621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993).
31. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2005).
32. See Birckhead. supra note 1. at.27-43.
33. For a detailed account of prosecutorial pressure for both waiver and nonpayment of legal
fees that resulted in a deferred prosecution agreement. see United States v. Stein (KPMG I). 435
F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
34. Studies of inadequate public defense funding are seemingly perennial and ubiquitous. See
The Spangenberg Group, http://www.spangenberggroup.com/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2007). For
simplicity's sake, this Article usually refers to legislatures as the funders of indigent defense.
More precisely. however. in many states, legislatures delegate to localities the task of funding
appointed counsel, or they designate a locally based funding source, such as revenue from the
jurisdiction's criminal fines. See Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of
Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2045 (2006).
35. 470 U.S. 68. 83 (1985).
36. In Caldwell v. Mississippi, the Mississippi Supreme Court approved a statute that required
a finding of reasonableness before defendants received funds for assistance to support their at-
[Vol. 57:365
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administrations are monitored, to ration scarce resources. 37 There-
fore, judges often establish norms for permissible defense attorney in-
vestigative efforts.38
Interestingly, and more subtly, something similar is true for retained
counsel. All defendants can hire counsel, but the government has
some means to limit defendants' resources for doing so, to bar choices
for particular attorneys, and to restrict attorneys' capabilities-such as
the privilege to have confidential communications with clients. The
primary example of the last is the regulation permitting the govern-
ment to monitor client communications while in federal detention,
which affects appointed counsel as well. 39 Courts can limit choices for
a specific lawyer through pro hac vice motions, motions to change
torney. 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985) (holding that denying an investigator, a fingerprint expert,
and a ballistics expert to a defendant under a state law that predicated access to such expert
assistance on a finding of reasonableness was constitutional).
37. See, e.g., Status of Indigent Defense in Georgia: A Study for the Chief Justice's Commission
on Indigent Defense, in SPAGENBERO REPORT 68 (2003), available at http://www.georgiacourts.
org/aoc/press/idc/idchearings/spangenberg.doc (superior court judge in a large urban county
stated that, "[a]s far as experts are concerned, I am as cheap as possible. This is a Chevy opera-
tion, not a Mercedes operation. We are under extreme pressure from the county to hold our
expenses down."); id. at 70 (a chief superior court judge in a rural circuit reported "that he feels
acute pressure from the counties to cut back on expenditures on counsel, experts and
investigators").
38. In Georgia, a 2003 study made these findings:
[E]ven attorneys who feel that an investigator or expert would help in their cases are
reluctant to file motions securing investigative help a) because it will be a waste of time,
as such requests are routinely denied and/or b) because it might annoy judges. In Clay-
ton County, attorneys told us that even in death penalty cases to get approval for inves-
tigators was akin to "pulling teeth."
Id. at 66 (judges in one Georgia county openly admitted to unconstitutional rationing, granting
experts and investigators only in capital cases, despite the Ake doctrine). Sometimes attorneys
learn to simply not apply for funds despite having a plausible claim for them. Others continue to
apply in the face of likely denial. See, e.g., id. at 68 (appointed attorney in one Georgia county
reported that "out of the 20 times he has applied for an expert he has never received an expert").
Courts can sometimes gain lawyers' cooperation in efficient adherence to the norm, such as
through implicit penalties for defendants who demand Ake funds and lose. See Darryl K.
Brown, Criminal Procedure Entitlements, Professionalism, and Lawyering Norms, 61 OHIO ST.
L.J. 801, 828-31 (2000). Comparable signaling to ration other costly rights, such as jury trials, is
well documented. See Roy B. FLEMMING ET AL., THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK
IN CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES 110, 118-19 (1992) (providing similar data-documenting
trial judges' views of "illegitimate" trials); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPER-
IENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 143 (1978) (recounting a trial
judge insisting that any defendant "deserves to be penalized for the trial" and consuming court
resources unless "he has got a reasonable position" for insisting on one); see also In re Inquiry
Concerning Judge Darmon, 487 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1985) (removing a judge from office for, among
other things, telling defendants on the record that they would incur sentence enhancements for
insisting on jury trials or defense attorneys in certain cases).
39. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2005).
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counsel, and by supervising attorneys' conflicts of interest.40  Trial
courts enjoy "some discretion to limit the exercise of the right to
counsel of choice when insistence upon it would disproportionately
disadvantage the government or interfere with the ethical and orderly
administration of justice." 4 1
One of the two most effective tools for limiting resources for private
counsel is forfeiture. At Congress's urging, prosecutors use broad for-
feiture statutes to gain pretrial restraint of assets that defendants need
to pay defense lawyers.42 Those assets must stem from criminal pro-
ceeds, although prosecutors have convinced courts to encumber even
fee payments that firms contractually owe to officers on the theory
that the officers' fraud on the firm led to that fee indemnification enti-
tlement.43 The newer tool to reduce private defense funding is the
Thompson Memo policy, under which prosecutors bargain to cut off
lawfully acquired sources of payment for private defense counsel by
giving corporate firms strong incentives to not indemnify attorneys'
fees for individual firm officers who face separate risks of
indictment. 44
Note the parallel between these practices on the one hand and the
Ake doctrine and indigent defense funding on the other. In each, the
government attempts to regulate the amount of resources a defendant
can devote to a case based on an implicit conclusion about the amount
of resources necessary for an appropriate adjudication. There are im-
40. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006) (describing permissible limits
on defendants' preference for private attorneys); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988)
(addressing defendants' waivers of attorney conflict of interest). See also Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) (holding that the right to counsel includes the right to be repre-
sented by counsel of one's choice and the right to a preparation period sufficient to insure a
minimal level of quality of counsel).
41. United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1986); accord Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163
(holding that trial courts must be accorded "broad latitude" in deciding defendants' motions for
substitution of counsel).
42. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2000). All three branches play a role in this policy: Congress
enacted forfeiture statutes; the Supreme Court approved their use to deny defendants resources
for counsel; and trial courts decide forfeiture actions, while prosecutors decide whether to imple-
ment forfeiture statutes in particular cases.
43. Prosecutors briefly succeeded with this argument last year in the prosecution of Westar
corporation officers, although the district court later allowed the firm to pay the attorney-fee
funds into an escrow account pending the outcome of the forfeiture action. See United States v.
Wittig, No. 03-40142-JAR, 2004 WL 1490406 (D. Kan. June 30, 2004) (allowing a firm to give
defendant-officers funds for attorneys' fees but enjoining defendants from transferring those
funds to their attorneys), modified, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D. Kan. 2004), reinstated, 2005 WL
1227914 (D. Kan. May 23, 2005); Morvillo & Anello, supra note 9 (describing the Westar
litigation).
44. One federal court recently held this practice unconstitutional. See United States v. Stein
(KPMG I1), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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portant differences, to be sure. In particular, prosecutors strive to
limit defense resources in the private counsel context, while courts
and legislatures strive to limit indigent defendants' resources. Still,
these practices, as well as other government limitations on defense
counsel, share a common motivation to address an unavoidable prob-
lem: defendants have incentives to overlitigate cases. The minority of
innocent defendants should make every effort to prove their inno-
cence. But the system does not permit this, because guilty defend-
ants-whether street-crime offenders or corporations-would
frequently overlitigate as well in efforts to postpone the day of reck-
oning or to generate a "false negative," an acquittal, or a dismissal
despite their factual guilt.
In the context of public defense, legislatures' dilemmas are clear.
They must allocate enough funds to support a fair process that gener-
ates accurate results. But they cannot give defendants all they would
like-both because legislatures work within budget limits and because
the resulting overlitigation would hinder prosecutors' conviction of
the guilty. Indigent defense funding inevitably depends on a calculus
that determines how much money is needed for fairness and accuracy
in the form of preventing "false positives"-meaning wrongful convic-
tions-as opposed to an amount so high that it generates wrongful
acquittals or otherwise hinders law enforcement. No government ac-
tor is well positioned to make that judgment, yet the judgment is inev-
itable. Additionally, prosecutors try to further refine these cost
savings case-by-case, through incentives for quicker pleas based on
less pretrial litigation.45
This balancing act is also necessary in the context of private counsel.
The government cannot set pay rates for private counsel, but it has
other means to limit their resources and capabilities. Furthermore, it
aims to limit those resources for the same reasons. Wealthy defend-
ants are fully capable of overlitigating to forestall enforcement efforts.
Corporate cases are expensive for prosecutors to pursue in the first
place. Investigations require great commitments of time and exper-
tise. Unlike typical street crimes, defense lawyers are involved early
in the investigative stage and have a real ability to slow investigations,
in part because defendants control most of the relevant information.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). In Ruiz, the Court approved a key
component of "fast track" plea bargaining-waiver of the constitutional right to impeachment
evidence on government witnesses. Id. at 633. In this fast track setting, which courts developed
to handle high volumes of illegal immigration cases in border districts, prosecutors strive for
larger cost savings by convincing defendants to plead guilty quickly, with a minimum of pretrial
investigation or litigation. Id. at 622.
373
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Sometimes a defendant's wealth leads to a well-litigated case and
thereby avoids wrongful or excessive conviction. 46 Other times, a de-
fendant's wealth allows her to hinder enforcement and force an un-
merited acquittal, a decision to not prosecute, or an overly favorable
settlement. 47
With these concerns in mind-and motivated by a litigant's natural
tendency to seek advantage over an adversary-prosecutors often
seek to restrict defendants' legal resources. They use forfeiture to cut
defendant resources 48 and seek waivers of privileges, attorney-fee
payments, or other entitlements, such as discovery needed to litigate
thoroughly.49 Prosecutors are tempted to use those tools, because
they often have enough information-or think they do-about de-
fendants' conduct to make confident judgments on wrongdoing; they
know what efficiencies will be gained from defendants' cooperation
and have some sense of the risks of "false negatives" from zealous
defense litigation. Nonetheless, a party adversary is poorly situated to
determine how much ability her opponent should have to fight back
or make unchecked judgments about guilt. 50 Prosecutors may seek
these incentives to lower costs in well-grounded cases or to gain tacti-
cal advantages regardless of the case's merits.
In the abstract, defense resources should be scant when they hurt
accuracy and ample when they aid it. Yet, just as legislatures cannot
sort innocent defendants from guilty ones and generously fund only
46. Wrongful convictions are a plausible problem in complex crimes, due to the fuzzy lines
between criminal conduct, civil wrongs, and permissible action. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning.
KPMG Defendants' Unity Starts to Fray at the Edges, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at C3 ("[T]he
KPMG case ... [hinges] on the complicated and vague tax code,... is dauntingly complex, and
no court has ever ruled the tax shelters in question illegal.").
47. For a study describing recent deferred-prosecution and nonprosecution agreements in cor-
porate cases, see CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, CRIME WITHOUT CONVICTION: THE RISE OF
DEFERRED AND NON PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (Dec. 28, 2005), available at http://corporate
crimereporter.com/deferredreport.htm.
48. Cf Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing Vi-
sion of the Right to Counsel. 105 HARV. L. REV. 670. 710 (1992) (arguing that whether reducing
defendants' funds to pay attorneys through forfeiture is a good idea depends "on whether it
increases or decreases accuracy").
49. See, e.g.. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622.
50. Difficult questions of guilt are an oft-expressed concern in complex cases, such as the
Enron and KPMG prosecutions, in which prosecution theories of liability may be novel. See,
e.g., Browning, supra note 46. But even routine criminal cases with relatively simple bodies of
evidence, such as eyewitness accounts, can nonetheless present levels of uncertainty that make
prosecutors' conclusions about facts contestable. See Robert P. Burns, Fallacies on Fallacies: A
Reply, 3 INT'L COMMENTARY ON EVIDENCE art. 4, at 3 (2006), http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol3/
issl/art4 (discussing criminal evidence that is "simple and powerful and much too often unrelia-
ble," leaving defendants to "undermine this simple and strong evidence by an accumulation of
circumstantial and, sometimes, expert evidence").
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the former, prosecutors and judges cannot sort rich defendants-espe-
cially at the early stages of investigations when facts are limited-in
order to apply their range of defense-constraining strategies only to
the guilty. Nonetheless, calibrating defense attorneys' resources in or-
der to balance interests in accuracy, fairness, and effective enforce-
ment is inevitable. In some forms, it is normatively appropriate. But
legislatures and prosecutors both have reasons to get the balance
wrong, independent of the information deficit about guilt or inno-
cence. Legislatures face political pressure to fund indigent defense at
levels lower than needed for accuracy, in part because wrongful con-
victions can go undetected. Prosecutors make their judgments
through the lens of a partisan adversary seeking a tactical advantage.
As things stand, prosecutors enjoy at least as much freedom from judi-
cial supervision as legislatures. This Article does not consider
whether legislatures' deficiencies can be solved. But, despite the Su-
preme Court's grant of broad bargaining powers to prosecutors, there
are means to check the most worrisome efforts of prosecutors to con-
strain defense counsel.
III. PROBLEMATIC LIMITS ON PRIVATELY FUNDED
DEFENSE COUNSEL
When the Supreme Court has defined some components of the ben-
efits that the right to counsel entails, it has limited that right in notable
ways. As this Part explains, the Court's decisions on conflict-of-inter-
est and forfeiture of funds necessary to pay private counsel limit de-
fendants' abilities to hire particular counsel and strengthen
prosecutors' abilities to regulate defense counsel. But those doctrines,
at least, require judicial approval and legislative authorization, so that
the executive branch is not unchecked or unsupervised in its efforts to
interfere with defense counsel. Demands for privilege waivers, fol-
lowing the Thompson Memo policy, fit a different model: the only
check on prosecutors in that case is defense counsel, who can choose
not to waive those entitlements. 5' Prosecutors can make nonwaiver
extremely-probably unfairly-costly by threats of charging severity.
Courts do not supervise this bargaining process. The problem is worse
with the other Thompson Memo policy: incentives for nonpayment of
corporate employees' individual legal expenses. 52 Prosecutors impose
those incentives without meaningful court or legislative supervision,
and nonpayment of attorneys' fees eliminates the remaining check of
51. See Thompson Memo, supra note 3.
52. See id.
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capable defense counsel. Despite a recent district court decision in
the KPMG case finding that prosecutorial tactic unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court has left little doctrinal basis for restricting prosecu-
tors' bargaining incentives for defendant cooperation.
53
The traditional approach underlying early counsel cases provides
observers with a strong basis to criticize many of these defense-limit-
ing policies. The premise of the adversarial process is that the com-
petitive marshalling, inspection, and interpretation of evidence
produce the truth. 54 When both parties gather relevant evidence and
scrutinize their opponents' evidence, the factfinder will have a solid
basis for making an accurate decision. In this view, stronger defense
counsel is better, for the most part; it is rare that the defense would so
overwhelm government resources as to skew outcomes.55 Put this
way, the issue is setting the minimum in defense resources to assure
fairness and accuracy.
This was the premise of the early right-to-appointed-counsel cases,
starting with Powell v. Alabama, which first justified rights to ap-
pointed counsel on grounds that defense attorneys are necessary for
accurate adjudication. 56 Without defense lawyers, "though he be not
guilty, [a defendant] faces the danger of conviction," perhaps from
"irrelevant" or "incompetent evidence" or the inability to present his
"perfect" defense. 57 In Powell, Gideon v. Wainwright,58 and later
counsel cases, systemic and defendant interests did not conflict: both
were served by the presence of counsel. In this view, the sorts of in-
fringements on a counsel's capabilities described above appear suspi-
cious; they look like risks to public interests in accurate fact finding, as
well as the defendants' self-interest.
But more counsel does not always mean greater accuracy, despite
defense attorneys' tactics of impeaching reliable evidence or other-
wise misleading to serve a client's interest. The classic right-to-coun-
53. United States v. Stein (KPMG 11), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see infra notes
94-97 and accompanying text.
54. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) ("The system assumes that adversarial
testing will ultimately assist the public interest in truth and fairness."); Herring v. New York, 422
U.S. 853, 862 (1975) ("The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that parti-
san advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be
convicted and the innocent go free.").
55. David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993). The one
context in which the defense might overwhelm government resources is in corporate crime
cases-cases that were not on the Court's mind in deciding the early right-to-counsel cases, but
cases that the Thompson Memo exclusively targets.
56. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
57. Id. at 68-69 (describing prosecutors' resource advantage and its effect on outcomes).
58. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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sel cases, like Powell and Gideon, were characterized by two features
that courts and prosecutors did not have to address until decades later
when criminal law became a common tool to address complex organ-
ized and corporate crime. First, granting counsel in these cases
presented no prospect that the defense team would be so capable as to
unduly hinder the prosecution-state resources would still exceed the
defendant's. Second, these early cases did not present the challenge
of counsel's involvement in the preindictment, investigative stage of
criminal law enforcement. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel
does not attach until charging, at which point investigation is well
under way, if not complete. 59 When these two factors change, defen-
dant and systemic interests diverge. The story of regulating right to
counsel in recent decades can be told as one of adjusting features of
defense representation to minimize their impact on adjudicative accu-
racy and effective law enforcement.
Defense counsel play a different and more potent role in complex
criminal cases, whether the target is a legitimate corporate firm or or-
ganized criminal group. Investigations of complex crimes often occur
over substantial periods of time, and attorneys usually require signifi-
cant information from the defendants. Corporations typically possess
the documents, employee testimony, and other evidence the govern-
ment needs to build a case for indictment. Thus, the government usu-
ally needs the cooperation of insiders. What makes these sorts of
cases different from Powell and Gideon is not just that critical infor-
mation is controlled by defendants. It is that defendants often-and
in corporate crime cases, virtually always-have preexisting, ongoing
59. The Sixth Amendment counsel right does not clearly attach until the filing of formal crimi-
nal charges or another initiation of formal adversarial proceedings. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689 (1972) (holding that the right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversarial pro-
ceedings, normally marked by "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment"); see also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 231-32 (1977) (holding that the right to
counsel attaches at the defendant's initial appearance before a magistrate). Prior to Moore and
Kirby, the Court defined the Sixth Amendment counsel right as attaching at all "critical stages"
of criminal proceedings, meaning "at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial
rights of a criminal accused may be affected." Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967); see also
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). The brighter lines of Moore and Kirby proba-
bly supplant the more general standard of Escobedo, which defined the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel as attaching when an "investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect." Escobedo, supra, at 490; see also CHARLES
H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 16.03, at 365 (2d ed.
1986); id. § 16.08, at 409 (suggesting that Escobedo was supplanted by Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966)). Cf. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (stating that the right to
counsel attaches at the "critical" stage when "the accused [is] confronted ... by the procedural
system, or by his expert adversary ... in a situation where the results of the confrontation might
well settle the accused's fate" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
377
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
relationships with legal counsel. Sometimes, defense counsel can even
match the government's litigation resources. Represented defendants
present much greater information barriers to law enforcement. Un-
like unrepresented street-crime suspects, who often make incriminat-
ing statements after arrest, white-collar suspects with counsel more
frequently frustrate prosecutions through noncooperation and are
much less likely to cooperate without extracting some compensation
in the form of nonprosecution agreements, plea deals, immunity, or
other favorable settlement terms.
Fifteen years ago, Pamela Karlan described a series of doctrines
that diminish the advantages of defendants with ongoing counsel rela-
tionships-what she called "relational representation. ' 60 Nearly all
corporate crime suspects and many organized crime offenders have
ongoing representation during investigations and, even earlier, during
their wrongful conduct. 61 That differs from typical street-crime de-
fendants, who mostly have "discrete representation"-lawyers who
are hired or appointed only for a specific case, usually after the gov-
ernment files charges. This expanded representation in complex
cases, through private ordering, prompted the Court to tailor some
counsel doctrines in ways that give the government a greater capacity
to limit defendants' advantages from early, sophisticated
representation.
One defense advantage in this setting is a greater ability to frustrate
government efforts to win the defendant's cooperation, often through
a variation of the Prisoner's Dilemma-the scenario in which any sus-
pect gains an advantage in being the first to confess. 62 When counsel
represents multiple suspects, defendants can better avoid yielding to a
disadvantageous Prisoner's Dilemma. Common counsel can help sus-
pects share information and coordinate strategies, increasing the odds
that nobody cooperates to the detriment of others. If effective, this
coordination, together with other defendant strategies, stymies prose-
60. Karlan, supra note 48, at 672-73.
61. See Bruce A. Green, Her Brother's Keeper: The Prosecutor's Responsibility When Defense
Counsel Has a Potential Conflict of Interest, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 323, 358 n.119 (1989) (describing
how some attorneys become virtual "house counsel" for criminal enterprises); Bruce A. Green,
"Through a Glass, Darkly": How the Court Sees Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Law-
yers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1227 n.116 (1989) (discussing how both organized crime families
and corporations may retain attorneys to represent their employees).
62. Karlan, supra note 48, at 691, 694-96; William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Proce-
dure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761, 797-801 (1989) (discussing Wheat and common counsel as a way for
defendants to avoid Prisoner's Dilemmas).
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cutions; suspects win the dilemma game, and the guilty may go
unpunished. 63
Some doctrines give the government tools to disrupt defendants'
relationships with particular attorneys. Wheat v. United States helps
prosecutors disrupt the coordination role of attorneys who represent
two or more defendants in the same enterprise.64 Attorneys in that
setting face conflicts of interest. But clients might nonetheless consent
to those conflicts if they want the attorney for other reasons-either
because she is exceptionally skilled or because she helps defendants
coordinate strategies in their common interest. Wheat effectively
gives prosecutors a veto over defendants' decisions to waive such con-
flicts of interest and thus limits their ability to share a lawyer.65 The
government thereby blocks a defendant's choice to retain a specific
attorney.
In corporate cases, different parties rarely share the same lawyer.
They do, however, often share the same benefactor. The firm pays for
its own counsel, as well as attorneys for its employees. Especially
when firms have discretion to make those payments for others' legal
representation, they gain an ability to coordinate and even coerce co-
operation among defendants to frustrate-or aid-government inves-
tigators and to closely monitor their behavior in the process. A firm
may, for example, pay for attorneys only for agents who cooperate
with the government, because the firm thereby gains an advantage-
the government may then prosecute those individuals instead of the
firm and reward the firm's cooperation. 66 Alternatively, a firm could
pay legal fees only for agents who support the firm's strategy of non-
cooperation in an effort to "circle the wagons" and deny the govern-
63. It bears emphasis that, in reality, firms as entities often cooperate early and extensively
against individual officers; there seem to be few efforts to maintain "prisoner" coordination once
government investigations commence. The firm's agents typically state that they simply want to
do the right thing. It may also be, however, that firms, as entities, seek advantages by "shift[ing]
liability downward" onto individual officers. William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shift-
ing, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1406 n.267 (1999). Another possi-
ble reason is that those speaking for the firm at this stage-frequently, directors and attorneys-
have little personally at risk and so have little reason not to offer the firm's cooperation against
individual agents in exchange for lenient treatment of the entity.
64. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
65. Id. at 159-60.
66. Again, KPMG was typical in this regard. It used payment of employees' legal fees to
encourage their cooperation with the government, then convinced the government not to indict
the firm. United States v. Stein (KPMG 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 347-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also
Thompson Memo, supra note 3 (describing factors that prosecutors consider when they decide to
charge individuals versus firms).
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ment sufficient evidence to build a case. 67 Whatever the choice, firms
as benefactors create the same problem for the government that a
shared attorney among co-defendants does: they improve and pro-
vide an enforcement mechanism for coordination among defendants.
KPMG, the focus of a recent complex tax fraud case, is representa-
tive of a firm with an arrangement for payment of employees' attor-
neys' fees that gives the firm this type of coordinating power.68 At the
government's urging, KPMG leveraged its power as a benefactor. It
agreed to pay fees only for employees who cooperated with the gov-
ernment. 69 KPMG monitored its agents' legal strategies and, when
some tried to act in their own self-interest, threatened payment cut-
offs for noncooperators. 70
By encouraging firms to leverage their benefactor status for the
government's advantage, the Thompson Memo policy seeks to disrupt
defendants' coordination advantage to resist Prisoner's Dilemmas. It
also generally undercuts the advantage of well-funded counsel.71
Even without the power to coordinate defendants and witnesses, good
attorneys aim to control information disclosure. 72 They seek to keep
incriminating evidence from the government unless it can be traded
67. Corporate noncooperation is not unheard of. In March 2006, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) fined Merrill Lynch $2.5 million for obstructing an SEC investigation by,
among other things, withholding email records. Kevin Burke, SEC Fines Merrill $2.5 Million in
Settlement Over Obstruction Charges, REGISTERED REP., Mar. 15, 2006, available at http://regis-
teredrep.com/news/sec-fines-merrill/index.html; Deni Connor, Merrill Lynch Fine for Unrecover-
able E-mails, NETWORKWORLD.COM, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www.networkworld.com/weblogs/
storage/011527.html.
68. Technically, KPMG is a partnership rather than a corporation, and some whose fees it
covered were partners rather than employees. KPMG 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 340. However, for
simplicity's sake, this Article often ignores this distinction, which is irrelevant for present
purposes.
69. Id. at 340, 345, 347 (recounting KPMG's policy to pay legal fees only for partners and
employees who cooperated with the government).
70. Id. at 347 (describing how, when the government notified KPMG of an agent's noncooper-
ation, KPMG would notify an agent's counsel that legal fee payments would cease in ten days
unless the agent resumed cooperation with prosecutors).
71. It is hard to generalize about corporate defendants' actual behavior in Prisoner's Dilem-
mas. Prosecutors cite "circling the wagons" behavior in some cases, meaning parties try to resist
the investigation by coordinating their noncooperation. But clearly, firms often cooperate. That
may be a function of the professional culture among lawyers and officers who view their conduct
as law-abiding, at least in ambiguous cases; it may be that firms routinely see advantages for the
firm in cooperating by disclosing evidence that strengthens the government's cases against indi-
vidual defendants; or it may occur mostly in cases in which firms recognize that the government
likely already has evidence for a successful prosecution, and so they cooperate to seek leniency.
the best among poor options.
72. See KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS
AT WORK 103-80 (1985) (describing corporate defendants' strategies of information control dur-
ing criminal litigation).
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for some advantage-leniency or nonprosecution. The job, and effect,
of good defense lawyering is often to frustrate investigations or shape
them toward favorable outcomes for their clients.
The government also targets well-funded defense counsel by re-
straining or confiscating defendants' assets under forfeiture statutes-
if those assets derive from criminal proceeds. 73 In Caplin & Drysdale,
the Supreme Court found no Sixth Amendment problem with forfei-
ture of funds needed to pay counsel. 74 The Court recognized the dif-
ference that the quality of defense counsel can make, but implied that
diminishing defendants' legal resources was a public good. 75 The
Court endorsed the lower court's recognition of a "compelling public
interest in stripping criminals ... of their undeserved economic power
... [including] the ability to command high-priced legal talent. '76
That language is telling. The Court recognized not only that coun-
sel fees correlate with counsel quality and that counsel quality makes
a difference in outcomes, but also that high-quality counsel sometimes
hinders the systemic goals of accuracy and effective law enforcement.
Lower courts now routinely approve forfeitures that deny defendants
funds to hire their counsel of choice or that seize funds already paid to
attorneys. 77 Courts, prosecutors, and members of Congress recognize
that a well-funded defense can conflict with enforcement interests.
Forfeiture regulates funding for privately retained counsel in the same
manner in which legislatures and trial courts calibrate allocation of
public funds for publicly funded counsel. The recent fraud prosecu-
tions of two Westar executives are illustrative. Using criminal forfei-
ture statutes, the government repeatedly sought, and eventually won,
restraint of attorneys' fees that the corporation owed the individual
defendants.78
73. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
74. 491 U.S. at 631.
75. Id. at 630 ("[A] major purpose motivating congressional adoption and continued refine-
ment of the racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations (RICO) and CCE forfeiture provi-
sions has been the desire to lessen the economic power of organized crime and drug enterprises.
This includes the use of such economic power to retain private counsel." (emphasis added)).
76. Id. (quoting In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered. 837 F.2d 637,
649 (4th Cir. 1988)).
77. For a recent survey of such cases, see Brian Fork, The Federal Seizure of Attorneys' Fees in
Criminal Forfeiture Actions and the Threat to the American System of Criminal Defense, 83 N.C.
L. REV. 205 (2004).
78. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Prosecutors also restrained the assets of Enron
defendants, though with little apparent effect on their abilities to obtain elite defense representa-
tion. See Carrie Johnson, After the Enron Trial, Defense Team is Stuck with the Tab, WASH.
POST, June 16, 2006, at DI (describing the assets of Jeffrey Skilling restrained by government
forfeiture efforts).
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The rationale of undue economic power is convenient for justifying
forfeitures where defendants' wealth is ill-gotten. But that rationale is
hard to limit to ill-gotten wealth. Any economic power poses the same
challenge to the public goals of accuracy and enforcement. It is not
the illegal origin of the economic power that frustrates those goals; it
is the economic power itself. Zealous defense counsel can always hin-
der or help accuracy. Thus, courts, legislatures, and prosecutors seek
to calibrate counsel resources so that defense attorneys aid accuracy
without excessively frustrating enforcement.
In this light, two policies expressed in the Thompson Memo become
clear. 79 The first gives corporate defendants strong incentives to
waive attorney-client and work-product privileges for both the firm
and, to the extent possible, individual agents. Those waivers signifi-
cantly limit firms' twin advantages: well-financed, early-stage repre-
sentation and control of critical evidence that the government needs
for an effective investigation. The policy is directed at precisely those
goals. The government asks for privilege waivers only to the degree
needed to investigate the suspected conduct, and prosecutors do not,
under the Thompson Memo policy, demand waiver of the privileges
with respect to attorneys' work representing their clients in the pend-
ing charges.
The second policy is more hotly disputed. Federal prosecutors
threaten to pursue harsh charges for firms that protect "culpable em-
ployees and agents . . . through the advancing of attorneys fees."'80
The Supreme Court has impliedly endorsed this strategic purpose,
limiting advantages that economic power gives to criminal defendants,
especially in contexts in which that power is likely to frustrate public
goals of accuracy and effective enforcement. 81 But prosecutors pursue
this strategy without legislative authorization or judicial supervision,
and it can effectively remove defense-counsel opposition to
prosecutors.
In United States v. Stein, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York recently held that prosecutors' pressure on
KPMG to deny attorneys' fees to employees was unconstitutional. 82
79. See Thompson Memo, supra note 3.
80. Id.
81. Associate Attorney General Thompson made this point surprisingly clear by defending
the policy that bears his name in language that echoes the Caplin & Drysdale rationale. He
argued that suspects "don't need fancy legal representation" if they believe they did not act with
criminal intent. Laurie P. Cohen, In the Crossfire: Prosecutors' Tough New Tactics Turn Firms
Against Employees, WALL. ST. J., June 4, 2004, at Al.
82. United States v. Stein (KPMG I1), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("The consti-
tutional violation here was the government's improper interference with the payment of the
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Its rationale was that prosecutorial bargaining was unconstitutional
"government interference" with a defendant's right to obtain "defense
resources lawfully available to him" and thus violated due process
rights to fairness and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 83 De-
spite broad language throughout the Supreme Court's case law about
the importance of defense counsel to fundamental fairness, the
KPMG decision is on shaky constitutional ground. The Supreme
Court has never limited prosecutors' power to offer harsh incentives
in the form of lawful charging decisions. The district court's sweeping
due process analysis 84 found that the government's pressure on
KPMG was "not justified by any governmental interest" and its "de-
liberate interference with the defendants' rights was outrageous and
shocking in the constitutional sense, because it was fundamentally at
odds with two of our most basic constitutional values-the right to
counsel and the right to fair criminal proceedings."85 Yet that reason-
ing contradicts the Supreme Court doctrine that both endorses prose-
cutors' tactics to limit wealthy defendants' counsel resources and gives
prosecutors unfettered bargaining discretion-a shift that is probably
advisable as a policy matter, but not now supported by the Court's
Fifth and Sixth Amendment case law.86
However, appellate courts, as well as firms, may be receptive to an-
other way to limit this powerful prosecutorial tool to diminish defense
counsel. Part of their motivation should be courts' desire for a role in
the calibration that prosecutors now make, and which the Stein court
properly examined: what level of resources do defendants need to
make a prosecution a reliable and fair adjudication? 87 Prosecutors
KPMG Defendants' defense costs."); United States v. Stein (KPMG 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330,
361-62, 365-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
83. KPMG 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 361.
84. As one example of the court's broad rationale, it found that the constitutional "right to
fairness" means that "the government may not both prosecute a defendant and then seek to
influence the manner in which he or she defends the case." Id. at 357. This is a generalization in
some tension with the government's approval of forfeiture of attorneys' fees, defendants' inabil-
ity to waive an attorney's conflict of interest, and prosecutorial pressure to waive constitutional
rights to discovery. The court's rationale that "the government's interference ... limited what
the KPMG Defendants can pay their lawyers to do" is also in some tension with rationales
behind forfeiture of attorneys' fees. Id. at 371.
85. KPMG II, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 414.
86. For one argument it should, see William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargain-
ing and the Decline of the Rule of Law, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIEs 351 (Carol S. Steiker
ed., 2006).
87. See KPMG 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362 (noting that preparing and trying a case with six
million document pages and trial expected to last several months "requires substantial re-
sources," and cutting off legal fees "would impact defendants' ability to present the defense").
See also infra notes 90-122 and accompanying text.
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make a similar judgment in seeking attorney fee forfeiture, but with
legislative and judicial input. Here, by bargaining for legal fee cut-
offs, prosecutors do much the same without another branch's input.
Another part of the court's motivation to limit prosecutors' bargaining
power should come from recognizing that defense lawyers provide the
only remaining structural check to prosecutors formerly provided by
trials. 88 Regardless of what courts do, firms certainly want to limit
prosecutors' ability to bargain over fee indemnification. As explained
in Part IV, private contract is an effective tool for firms to stop this
prosecutorial pressure.8 9 Courts could easily support those contrac-
tual responses with a narrow constitutional rule that does not imply
wider limits on well-established bargaining power.
IV. A CONTRACT SOLUTION TO PROSECUTORIAL OVERREACHING
The Supreme Court has stated both that plea bargaining is "not
only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part" and
that it presumes prosecutors bargain for proper reasons.90 With this
view, the Court has done all it can to facilitate bargaining. Prosecu-
tors can threaten any charge or sentence, no matter how severe or
unusual, in order to induce defendants to waive their rights.91 In
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Court found that no threat of harsh pros-
ecution, no matter how disproportionate to defendants' wrongdoing
or how vindictively imposed in response to defendants' insistence on
constitutional rights, will make a prosecutor's bargaining tactics un-
constitutional. 92 There, when Paul Hayes declined a plea offer for a
five-year sentence for stealing an $88 check when he had two prior
felonies on his record, the prosecutor charged and convicted him
under a three-strikes law that sent him to prison for life without
parole. 93
88. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REv. 2463 (2004).
89. See infra notes 90-122 and accompanying text.
90. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). With America's expansive criminal
codes and the industrialized world's most severe set of sentencing laws, legal-but-harsh threats
are easy to make.
91. See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REv. 505 (2001). The Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause imposes no
real limit on the severity of sentences legislatures may enact. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957 (1991) (holding that mandatory life-without-parole was not cruel and unusual punishment
for possession of 650 grams of cocaine); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding life-
with-parole sentence for defendant's third nonviolent felony of minor theft); but see Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (overturning defendant's life-without-parole sentence for his third
nonviolent theft conviction).
92. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
93. Id. at 358. For a detailed account of Bordenkircher, see Stuntz, supra note 86.
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On the other side, the Court has given defendants bargaining
chips-constitutional and statutory rights. 94 The Court has never held
a constitutional right nonwaivable by defendants, though some lower
courts occasionally have with regard to a select few entitlements. 95
Defendants can waive all trial rights and are also permitted to waive
most other entitlements, including constitutional rights to appeal and
to receive discovery from the government.96 Defendants can also re-
spond to government incentives with cooperation, such as information
disclosure that often entails a waiver of a right not to disclose. Finally,
defendants might also respond with testimony or more elaborate acts,
such as undercover contact with other suspects.
Plea bargaining doctrine leaves little basis for courts to bar Thomp-
son Memo tactics. Aggressive prosecutorial bargaining for either
privilege waivers or cooperation, often in the form of refusing to pay
counsel fees for others, looks more like typical-if harsh-bargaining
than unconstitutional denial of counsel. Neither tactic denies defend-
ants representation. Privilege waivers allow firms to retain counsel,
but without the advantage of confidentiality in their communications
and work product. Convincing a firm to not pay officers' legal fees
merely denies other suspects ample private resources for hiring their
preferred counsel and litigation support.97 When prosecutors coerce
94. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995) (allowing defendant to waive protec-
tions of criminal procedure rule).
95. See, e.g., Lanier v. State, 635 So. 2d 813 (Miss. 1994) (holding that defendants cannot
waive their rights not to be sentenced above the statutory maximum punishment). See generally
Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L.
REV. 113 (1999). More often, it seems, courts will approve bargains even with illegal or unau-
thorized terms. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695 (2001)
(describing courts' widespread approval of bargains with unethical, or even illegal, terms).
96. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (holding that a prosecutor can condition a plea
bargain offer on a defendant's waiver of her constitutional right under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), to discovery of impeachment evidence against government witnesses); United
States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming the defendant's broad waiver of
appellate rights); United States v. Schuman, 127 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the
defendant had waived "any right to appeal or collaterally attack the conviction and sentence");
United States v. Guevara, 941 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that defendants can waive the
right to appeal sentences as part of plea bargains). See also Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204 (uphold-
ing the waiver of a court rule and an evidence rule that barred the admissibility of statements
made during plea negotiations). Cf United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) ("Whether
a particular right is waivable; . . . whether certain procedures are required for waiver: and
whether the defendant's choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the
right at stake.").
97. This latter agreement offers a twist without analogy in other plea bargaining exchanges:
the defendants who lose counsel resources are not the ones yielding to government incentives.
The firm agrees to cooperate by ending payments, but the officers suffer diminished counsel
resources. Ind'vidual defendants are not waiving counsel funds. The better analogy is that one
suspect suffers because another cooperates with the government, although the cooperation takes
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that nonpayment, they disrupt the primary form of private ordering
that funds white-collar cases. Those are cases in which expenses will
be especially high, and so suspects may face the unpleasant choice of
either exhausting personal wealth or reaching a plea deal after little
defense-side litigation.
Nonetheless, parties still have some counsel, and the limits on coun-
sel were achieved by party agreement, albeit under harsh-though
common-bargaining incentives. That is the larger problem for any
constitutional argument against Thompson Memo tactics. Limits on
counsel are achieved by negotiated agreements. To bar the Thompson
Memo incentives, a court would have to hold, for the first time, that
prosecutors' threats to pursue lawful charges are unconstitutional.
The district court's decision in the KPMG case notwithstanding, there
is little in the way of constitutional doctrine to restrain prosecutors'
hardball tactics to force waivers and pleas from defendants. Hard bar-
gaining is problematic, but the problem is not unique to the Thomp-
son Memo policy. It is a defining feature of the law of plea
bargaining.
The problem is that prosecutors' threats can be so severe as to con-
vince rational, innocent defendants to enter a plea or guilty defend-
ants to plead to more than they should. If a defendant thinks she is
not guilty, but estimates she has a one-in-four chance of being con-
victed and sentenced to life without parole, a plea for five years-
Hayes's choice in Bordenkircher-may look like the lesser of two in-
justices.98 For corporations and their agents, the choices can be com-
parably stark: firms lose their commercial viability when merely
indicted on certain forms of white-collar charges;99 witness accounting
firm Arthur Andersen's demise before its trial, which yielded a con-
viction that was later overturned. 00 Officers face personal financial
ruin through bearing the costs of defending a federal corporate crime
charge, holding aside any sentencing consequences.101
Prosecutors can induce rational defendants not only to waive rights
they would prefer to exercise, but also to waive them in the face of
a novel form-cutting another suspect's legal resources rather than providing evidence against
him.
98. Stuntz. supra note 86. at 372. For a fuller development of this point, see Oren Bar-Gill &
Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L. & ECON. 353 (2006).
99. See United States v. Stein (KPMG I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 337-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting
KPMG's fear of indictment in light of Arthur Andersen's demise).
100. Arthur Andersen L.L.P. v. United States. 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
101. As one example of how high legal fees can be for individual defendants charged in large
corporate crime cases. Enron's former CEO ran up an estimated $40 million in legal fees, $17
million of which was covered by insurance. See Johnson, supra note 78.
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insubstantial charges and processes that may uncover their meritless-
ness. t0 2 Further, the process itself-six- or seven-figure defense costs,
fatal reputational loss for firms, plus long pretrial detention and other
collateral consequences for street-crime suspects-may exact as much
pain as formal punishment.1 03 Thus, defendants are sometimes mak-
ing decisions about waiving procedural rights based on factors other
than the merits of the case: collateral consequences, litigation costs,
and risk aversion to the odds of high post-trial penalties, all familiar
concerns in civil litigation as well. 0 4
The Supreme Court has two routes to lessen this dynamic, but it has
taken neither. Prosecutors face no limits on the severity of their
charges or the amount of their plea discounts, 0 5 and defendants face
no limits on what terms they can bargain away.'0 6 Further, the Court
has endorsed forfeiture of defendant assets even when needed to pay
attorneys' fees.' 07 Thus, it is hard to see the unconstitutionality of the
Thompson Memo's pressure for privilege waivers or nonpayment of
attorneys' fees: prosecutors are simply threatening to file well-
grounded charges if defendants do not waive privileges or stop ad-
vancing legal fees to officers. Defendants are still free to hire counsel
with whatever other resources they possess.
It therefore seems that, for the Supreme Court to recognize consti-
tutional limits on Thompson Memo tactics, it would have to do the
unlikely. It would have to revise much of the doctrine that gives par-
ties broad leeway in plea bargaining. That is the implication of the
district court's holding in the KPMG case; the court dismissed indict-
ments when it found prosecutors' bargaining simply unfair under the
Due Process Clause.108
Yet appellate courts have an alternative for a much narrower consti-
tutional rule to limit much of prosecutors' abilities to coerce firms into
nonpayment of attorneys' fees. Interestingly, the key is that private
102. The district court in KPMG / seemed, like Captain Renault in Casablanca, "shocked,
shocked" to discover that prosecutors would like to interview witnesses without counsel, that
prosecutors insist on closely monitoring defendants' cooperation during the term of a deferred
prosecution agreement and that defendants experience prosecutorial charging threats as "the
proverbial gun to [the] head." KPMG 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
103. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994).
104. See generally Bibas, supra note 88.
105. For a proposal for such a limit, see Stuntz, supra note 86.
106. To put the latter point differently, no features of the adjudicatory process are mandatory.
107. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989)).
108. See United States v. Stein (KPMG 11), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 421, 437-38 (S.D.N.Y, 2007);
United States v. Stein (KPMG 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 362-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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firms must first play the primary role in reducing the government's
leverage over them. Although it is not explicit in the Thompson
Memo, under that policy, prosecutors pressure firms to not make dis-
cretionary attorneys' fee payments, but do not demand that firms
breach contractual obligations. 0 9
Not all firms benefit from this distinction, however, because corpo-
rations and partnerships currently vary in their contractual arrange-
ments for indemnifying officers' attorneys' fees. Some firms have no
explicit contractual obligations to indemnify their employees' attor-
neys' fees, and so all such payments are at the firms' discretion. That
was the case with KPMG, and it was the discretionary nature of its
payments to employees that gave prosecutors an opening to bargain
over those payments. t10
In many firms, however, corporate bylaws require firms to pay of-
ficers' attorneys' fees. That was the case with the Westar corporation,
which had to advance even the legal fees of officers accused of de-
frauding the corporation.'1 I In still other cases, firms take on an obli-
gation to pay legal fees in employment contracts. Further, some states
impose a statutory duty on firms to pay officers' attorneys' fees-
though many, including Delaware, do not. 1 2 Finally, firms often
purchase "D&O" insurance, which covers attorneys' fees for directors
and officers facing litigation arising from their work for the firm.
Through that last arrangement, the firm does not pay legal fees; the
insurer does.
When firms have explicit contractual duties to pay, whether through
bylaws, employment contracts, or statutes, cutting off fees would re-
quire a contractual or statutory breach, something even the most ag-
gressive prosecutors apparently do not demand. Much of what
defendants fear in the way of prosecutorial pressure to halt fee pay-
109. This was well documented in the KPMG case. See KPMG 11, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 402.
Furthermore, KPMG's long-standing practice of advancing fees might create an implied contract
obligation.
110. KPMG 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355 n.117.
111. United States v. Wittig, No. 03-40142-JAR, 2004 WL 1490406 (D. Kan. June 30, 2004),
modified, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D. Kan. 2004), reinstated, 2005 WL 1227914 (D. Kan. May 23,
2005).
112. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-108 (2005) (authorizing partners to agree to indemnify
one another); Morgan v. Grace, No. Civ.-A.-20430, 2003 WL 22461916, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29.
2003) (interpreting section 17-108 to permit agreements to advance counsel fees). See generally
3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS § 1344.10 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002) (citing and describing different versions of state
statutes regarding corporations' and partnerships' indemnification of attorneys' fees for employ-
ees or partners).
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ments to employees, then, could be solved simply by contract. 13
Moreover, even if prosecutors subsequently grow bold enough to de-
mand that firms breach contracts or corporate bylaws, courts will have
an easier way to bar that tactic than they would following the KPMG
case and imposing broad-reaching fairness limits on prosecutorial bar-
gaining tactics.
Lower courts, such as the District of Kansas in United States v. Wit-
tig, have already taken steps toward this approach by addressing
prosecutorial efforts to hinder corporate payment of attorneys' fees
through forfeiture. 14 Even when funds for attorneys' fees are forfeit-
able by individual defendants, courts enforce firms' contractual duties
to pay them, although defendants must place them in escrow pending
the forfeiture judgment.1 5 Judicial respect for contractual obligations
provides a narrow theory for the Supreme Court to restrain prosecu-
tors' demands for fee cutoffs without undermining the wide bargain-
ing discretion it otherwise gives prosecutors. The key is the standard
due process analysis, even though the Court has been distinctly un-
receptive to due process and Sixth Amendment arguments that forfei-
ture actions should be limited when defendants need the disputed
assets to pay."t 6
Under due process doctrine, courts typically balance three factors:
the private interest, the probable value of the proposed doctrinal safe-
guard, and the adverse impact upon the government's interests.'17 In
other due process contexts, lower courts have weighed defendants'
113. To be sure, firms have considerations other than the prospect of facing federal indictment
when they decide how to structure contract terms with employees. But concern about prosecu-
tors' practice is not sufficiently widespread that firms are likely to weigh this factor heavily in
making those contract choices.
114. In the trial of two executives convicted of defrauding the Westar corporation, the court
ordered the firm to pay the attorneys' fees it owed under its bylaws into an escrow account in
order to preserve the fees for later forfeiture determination. See United States v. Wittig, No. 03-
40142-JAR, 2004 WL 1490406 (D. Kan. June 30, 2004), modified, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D. Kan.
2004), reinstated, 2005 WL 1227914 (D. Kan. May 23, 2005). The KPMG court barred
prosecutorial interference with KPMG's payments to individual defendants without finding it
had a contractual duty to do so, although the court stressed that KPMG had statutory authority
to cover legal fees and quite possibly an implied contract duty to do so. KPMG 1, 435 F. Supp.
2d at 356.
115. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
116. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630 (1989) United
States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989). One reason for that deference is that forfeiture has
broad legislative authorization.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002); United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (applying Mathews in the civil forfeiture context);
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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ability to pay counsel of choice as a significant private interest1 18 in
addition to disfavoring firms' breach of their contractual duties to pay.
Putting those factors together, courts are more likely to find a weighty
private interest when that interest is not only the need to pay counsel,
but an obligation arising in a private contract. With the private inter-
est so defined, the due process rule-that prosecutors could not offer
incentives for defendants to breach contracts to advance attorneys'
fees of other defendants-should have little "adverse impact" on
prosecutors' otherwise wide-ranging abilities to offer hard incentives
for cooperation and settlement." 19
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court would ultimately endorse
this analysis. Its well-established record of not regulating prosecutors'
bargaining practices, its concern for defendants' economic power frus-
trating government enforcement objectives, and its lack of concern for
defunding counsel through forfeiture all point the other way. But the
Court's solicitousness in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez 20 for a de-
fendant's ability to hire counsel of his choice might indicate a willing-
ness to protect that same interest in other ways, especially when
Congress has not provided the means to undercut that interest as it
has with forfeiture. Importantly, the contract interest strengthens the
argument for a due process restriction, while also limiting such a doc-
trine to a narrow application-bargaining over obligatory counsel-fee
payments. That would leave prosecutors free to continue to bargain
for other concessions with draconian, Bordenkircher-type threats, as
well as to pursue limits on counsel funding through forfeiture actions.
Further, if firms make obligatory, rather than discretionary, pay-
ment of attorneys' fees their standard practice, courts would have ad-
ditional public policy reasons to protect those payments from
prosecutorial bargaining pressure. Nondiscretionary duties to pay le-
gal fees reduce firms' powers as benefactors who coordinate all sus-
pects' actions in an effort to resist or direct the government's
investigation. By taking on contractual duties to advance fees or ar-
ranging for payment through insurance policies, firms lose some
power over individual defendants that they could otherwise leverage
118. See, e.g.. United States v. Jones. 160 F.3d 641 (10th Cir. 1998). In holding that the defen-
dant had a due process right to a post-restraint hearing on the government's forfeiture action,
the court described the defendant's qualified right to counsel as "important" and one that, if
denied, would "work a permanent deprivation." Id. at 646.
119. See Ruiz. 536 U.S. at 631.
120. 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006) (reversing the defendant's conviction because the trial court vio-
lated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it refused to allow the defendant
to retain counsel of his choice by denying the defendant's motion to change counsel and denying
the attorney's request for admission to practice pro hac vice).
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to the government's disadvantage. 21 In this way, prosecutors still
gain-defendants have less ability to coordinate resistance to Pris-
oner's Dilemmas and other investigative strategies-even though they
face individual defendants with fully funded counsel.
Finally, the political economy of this approach should give it some
sub rosa appeal to the Court. Forfeiture is most frequently employed
in drug and organized-crime cases, while insurance and other contract
agreements for attorneys' fees are overwhelmingly restricted to the
context of legitimate firms. By protecting attorneys' fees paid through
contracts more than fees paid from forfeitable assets, the Court should
recognize that its combined body of law would target the enforce-
ment-frustrating economic power of traditional drug and organized-
crime defendants much more than white-collar defendants in legiti-
mate corporations. Even so, the government would continue to pos-
sess significant sets of other investigation, litigation, and bargaining
options to pursue both the corporation and their employees. 22
V. CONCLUSION
Providing corporate defendants a safe harbor for contractually de-
fined defense attorneys' fees keeps executive branch regulation of de-
fense counsel within reasonable parameters. Prosecutors retain
powerful tools to adjust defense counsels' capabilities. With legisla-
tive mandate, they reduce attorneys' fee funds through forfeiture.
With transparent rule-making procedures, they commit limited inva-
sions of detained defendants' attorney-client confidentiality. 123 Facing
the opposition of fully funded defense counsel, prosecutors can bar-
gain with firms for waivers of attorney-client and work-product privi-
leges just as they have long bargained for other defense waivers to
reach plea agreements. Each of those avenues faces a meaningful
check-Congress, rule-making procedures, or sophisticated defense-
attorney opposition.
121. Recall KPMG. with discretion to pay its partners' legal fees, made payments contingent
on the partners' legal strategies and monitored individuals' ongoing interactions with
investigators.
122. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Honorable John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized
Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095 (1995) (describing the advan-
tages of federal criminal law and criminal procedure rules for pursuing large-scale, organized-
crime offenders). As another example of tools to impose liability in tough cases, see the ac-
counts of prosecution under the many federal false statements statutes, to which prosecutors
often can turn when proof of other substantive charges is difficult. See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman
& William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual
Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 590-91 (2005).
123. For a description of the rule-making process in the context of this policy, see Birckhead,
supra note 1, at 28-29.
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However, this is not so with prosecutors' pressure on firms to de-
fund employees' defense representation. Note the odd posture of this
negotiation: the parties losing counsel are not waiving it in exchange
for prosecutorial concessions. The parties cutting off attorneys' fees
to others, in exchange for leniency, have well-funded counsel guiding
them through the negotiation. In this way, prosecutors defund indi-
vidual defendants' legal teams without check by either another gov-
ernment actor or by defense counsel whose client pays the full, direct
consequences for the concession. That gives prosecutors, who already
have the powerful tool of unregulated charging power, too much
power over their litigation opponents without any check by another
public or private actor.
That is important because of the structural role defense attorneys
play in contemporary litigation, especially in plea bargaining. Defense
counsel is now the only real structural commitment to accurate and
fair outcomes. In the early decades of the republic, lack of defense
counsel was not unusual, but other familiar features of criminal adju-
dication were not only common, but mandatory. In particular, trials
were much more frequent. While plea bargains grew steadily in the
nineteenth century, so did the appearance of defense counsel. 124 Yet
it was not clear even at the end of the century that defendants were
constitutionally allowed to waive jury trials.125 In a plausible sense,
trials substituted for counsel. Both are means to check the govern-
ment. Instead of defendants having professional lawyers to inspect
the government's case and marshal independent arguments or evi-
dence, the government presented its evidence to an independent
factfinder, to whom defendants could submit evidence as well. 26
Through those early decades, juries and judges were often greater
checks on the government than defense counsel. But, with the rise of
counsel, that changed. In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
made all key procedural components-trials, discovery, and compul-
sion and confrontation of witnesses-waivable and shifted to explicit
encouragement of plea bargaining. 27 Defendants with counsel were
presumed to be capable of protecting systemic interests in accuracy by
124. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING
IN AMERICA (2003).
125. See King, supra note 95, at 120-27.
126. This is much like the English criminal trial system through the eighteenth century, when
defense counsel were forbidden, but defendants compelled, to speak. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN,
THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (2003).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (approving waiver of constitutional
discovery rights); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); People v. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d
1022 (N.Y. 1989) (waiver of right to appeal).
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acting in their self-interest and consenting to pleas only when the gov-
ernment's evidence would prevail at trial.' 28 Adjudication shifted
from a public process to one of private negotiation-more than 90%
of cases are now resolved without trial-on the premise that defense
counsel provided safeguards for public interests, as well as defendant
interests. 129
The capacity of defense counsel to fulfill that role in the bulk of
criminal litigation, which is handled by appointed counsel in state
courts, is perennially in question due to legislatures' underfunding of
public defenders. Additionally, prosecutors have plausible arguments
that, in corporate crime litigation, counsel is effectively too strong to
serve public interests in accuracy and effective law enforcement. For-
feiture and privilege waivers are tactical responses to that concern.' 30
Limiting prosecutors' ability to bargain over defense funding only
to those cases in which third-party fee payments are not mandated by
contract provides a rough but effective rule to keep prosecutors from
overreaching in ways that pose risks to public interests, as well as pri-
vate ones. It gives corporate defendants and their employees a range
of options-insurance, contract, corporate bylaws-for providing liti-
gation fees that prosecutors cannot reach. There is an odd implication
to this doctrinal choice: courts seem more willing to protect contract
obligations from encroachment by public officials than they are the
constitutional right to counsel. But it is a path that not only gives
firms and officers a means to virtually nullify the most troublesome
policy of the Thompson Memo; it also accommodates the Court's doc-
trines on forfeiture of attorneys' fees and prosecutorial bargaining
power that, though controversial and problematic, are unlikely to see
revision anytime soon.
128. See generally King, supra note 95 (arguing that defendants should be able to waive most
rights because they have counsel to negotiate dispositions, replacing the need for mandatory
processes). The Court noted in Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930), that the absence of
counsel was a rationale for making jury trials non-waivable, and, because that rationale has
"ceased to exist," defendants could now waive juries. Juries are not "part of the frame of gov-
ernment" but instead were designed "primarily for the protection of the accused ... which he
may forego at his election." Id. at 293, 297-98, 307.
129. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT SENTENCING
OF CONVICTED FELONS, 2000, at tbls. 4.1, 4.2 (June 2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/abstract/scscfst.htm (estimating that 3% of felony convictions in state courts resulted from
jury trials and 95% from plea bargaining in 2000), U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 2001, at 1, tbl. 5 (Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fccp01.pdf (noting that 95% of federal felony convictions in
2001 occurred through plea bargaining).
130. Eavesdropping on client communications largely targets another set of risks-future vio-
lence and terrorism rather than investigation obstruction.
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